Whatever happened to integration?

Brendan Cox, David Goodhart, Eric Kaufmann and Richard Webber

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Preface

By David Goodhart

The UK is an increasingly diverse country. Most of the public value that diversity. But much more is coming and there are concerns that as this trend continues majority anxiety might grow, as it has in the US, in alarming ways. If we are to continue to build a tolerant country that feels comfortable in its diversity, we need to take integration more seriously. It is critical to building a multi ethnic democracy in which the majority feels that most minority citizens are embracing, at least to some degree, the common norms of society and minority communities have access to the full range of social and economic opportunities. Yet integration, as Brendan Cox describes, has been a political orphan with no one to promote its interests.

2022 is a good year in which to think about it more constructively as we emerge from Covid-19. As well as the first ever Platinum Jubilee celebrating the service of our longest reigning monarch, we will witness, among other things, the Commonwealth Games, the 100th anniversary of the BBC, the women's Euros and the men's World Cup.

Integration remains one of the slipperiest concepts in the political lexicon. The issue bubbles to the surface when home-grown Islamist terrorism strikes or when immigration hits the headlines for example during a refugee crisis. The rest of the time it sits beneath the surface of daily life, something that many people are acutely aware of but is rarely a subject for public discussion and even lacks a commonly used vocabulary.

The Government's tokenistic response to Louise Casey's unusually honest review of integration issues published as the end of 2016 underlines how hard it is for public policy to grapple with the issue.

Moreover, in recent years, the question of what there is for outsiders to integrate into has become more uncomfortably relevant as the majority itself has become increasingly diverse and many of the old ties of social connection have frayed. There is, as Brendan Cox argues, an integration issue for everyone not just for ethnic minority communities and recent arrivals.

Why is integration such a wicked problem? I think there are two main reasons. The first is simply that it is hard to know what is happening and what we do know is a mixed picture, both in relation to ethnic minorities and society as a whole.

Neighbourhood and school segregation has been declining, albeit slowly, for most ethnic minority groups as they spread out from inner city heartlands into the suburbs, including affluent ones like Oadby near Leicester or the Kingston area in South West London.

Moreover, work by the Webber Phillips data analytics company (see chapter two) has found that the decline in the White British population in inner city London, Birmingham, Manchester and other big metropolitan centres has slowed, or even reversed. This seems to be a mixture of poor minorities being priced out and young affluent whites moving into places like Brixton.

There are caveats to this broadly positive story. There are certain groups, like traditional Muslims, who remain in general very concentrated in certain places like the former mill towns where parallel lives are common.

And an even bigger caveat is that while minorities, say British Pakistanis and British Indians, are mixing more among themselves in so-called super diverse neighbourhoods and schools, the level of mixing between ethnic minorities taken as a whole and the white British majority is barely increasing at all, according to recent research, confirmed in our own analysis.

The second big reason we don't talk much about integration is that it is difficult to know what decent, fair-minded people from whatever background should feel about it. How much commonality is needed for society to function well? How much stress should we place on the white majority mixing more with minorities or vice versa? How much importance should we attach to ethnic minority integration compared with say integration across class or age or region? And how much should politics lean against so-called homophily, the tendency of people to gravitate towards people like themselves?

There are no clear answers to these questions but liberal democracies like ours place a high value on individual freedom and choice which makes it difficult to tell people where to live or where to send their children to school for the good of a more cohesive society, ethnically and otherwise. We are not Singapore, where this is the norm.

Moreover this tends to be a patchy issue with melting pot areas (especially in London), parallel lives areas (especially in the mill towns) and large areas of the country where the minority population is so small that the issue of minority integration just doesn't register—so there is not much by way of a national story.

Brendan Cox, the widower of Jo Cox the MP murdered by a white identity extremist, who has a particular interest in social cohesion issues, observes (in chapter one) that unlike most other political issues there is no consistent lobby for integration and neither of the main political parties has a strong incentive to pursue the issue.

So the laissez-faire British way—a combination of tolerance and indifference—summed up in the phrase "you can come here and still be your old self" has never been consistently challenged. Unlike some of our continental neighbours, and Canada, we have generally not had integration

packages for most newcomers, with language lessons and a guide to how their new country works and what it expects of them (resettled asylum seekers are one exception to this rule).

People have just got on with it, or not, with more or less encouragement from the majority. But our integration outcomes are not notably worse, and arguably a lot better, than most of the rest of Europe. And as the think tank British Future often points out our mixed race population is bigger and faster growing than in comparable countries.

Integration, you might say, is a permanent dilemma for multi-ethnic societies with large ethnic majorities like ours, and if there is no solution to the issues that it throws up then not talking about it much might be a rational strategy.

But that is surely too complacent especially as the ethnic minority population rises to 25% of the population in England, and much higher in some places, and issues of minority integration increasingly overlap with a broader lack of social connection.

Indeed, what research seems to show is that higher levels of diversity generate conflicting attitudes toward how best to manage that diversity. These diverging attitudes, over immigration and integration, increasingly form the core of political polarisation. And such differences are often less amenable to trade-offs, and more conducive to what Eric Kaufmann calls "zero-sum sacred values," than economic differences.

A pessimistic scenario is all too plausible: a country that is increasingly diverse at the national level but less diverse at the local level – with parallel lives in many parts of the country as people "hunker down" within their own group, anxious about the pace of change and of an unforgiving race politics that makes us wary of normal human interaction.

The country could gradually diverge, like the US with its red states and blue states, both ideologically and demographically. We could see, on the one hand, big urban centres where the ethnic groups and lifestyles are highly diverse, the politics broadly on the left, and attachment to existing national traditions weak, while on the other hand most towns and the countryside remain overwhelmingly white with much stronger attachment to traditional values and national traditions. How can we join together to deal with problems that may require big shared sacrifices, like climate change, with such a cleavage running through the land?

There are two reasons for optimism and also for believing that this is a good moment to be returning to this challenging issue. The first is the pandemic and the reserves of solidarity it has uncovered, from small-scale neighbourliness to massive state action to preserve jobs. And, as Brendan Cox argues, despite all the conflict and pain, surveys show that most people felt the country did come together when it mattered.

The second reason is that issues of ethnic minority integration and segregation are increasingly seen as part of *a broader problem of generating social cohesion*. In an individualistic society there are fewer points of connection—from what we believe to what we watch on TV—and a weakening of institutions that used to bring us together.

If ethnic minority integration is seen in this bigger context it makes the issue easier to discuss without appearing to pick on minorities or question their right to diverge from majority behaviour in certain respects. The conversation becomes more centred on what we *all* need to do to foster connection and community.

Nonetheless the issue of majority-minority integration is the main focus of this report and the subject of the original research on residential segregation in chapter two by Richard Webber and Eric Kaufmann.

Brendan Cox's contribution, which precedes it, provides an equally original analysis of how the political class has thought about integration issues in the past 20 years and how little the anxiety about the issue has been translated into effective policy, a failure that he then perceptively explains.

The third chapter touches on the issue of schools and pulls together some ideas about how thinking and policy on integration should proceed.

Each chapter has a somewhat different tone and angle of approach and can be read independently of the others, but I hope that the whole is more than the sum of the parts.

Chapter One: The problem, and why it's such a wicked one

By Brendan Cox

Introduction

Humans have evolved to be social animals and isolation and disconnection causes us crises in both our physical and mental health. If we had begun to forget this, the last two years of forced social distancing has reminded us all of how much we need to connect with each other. But long before Covid hit, traditional forms of mutual connection and belonging were already weakening.

Historically many British people's sense of national identity has been related to longstanding connection to a particular place and people, an ethnic identity underpinned by strong connecting institutions and local bonds. But across the western world those traditional roots of identity are no longer enough to bind together nations. It is therefore widely, and rightly, assumed that building a broader non-ethnic civic identity is essential.

Britain is on the verge of a diversity boom. While the UK is currently about 20% non-white ethnic minority, by 2050, in other words less than 30 years, it will be between one third and 45% minority. This could bring it to similar levels as the present-day US.

If we don't all look and sound the same, the nature and depth of our mutual connections become even more important for building our sense of belonging. Yet these other connections have been shrinking as social isolation grows and our connecting institutions wither. From rotary clubs to trade unions, churches to local pubs our connecting institutions are weaker and their membership less diverse than ever before. Though many of them still try to bridge divides and create connections, they are less well placed to do so.

This change is being felt. According to a YouGov poll for More in Common in 2021 38% of British people agree (strongly or somewhat) with the proposition that: "Sometimes I feel like a stranger in my own country". And more than a fifth of British people say they are always or sometimes lonely.

These feelings of cultural anxiety and disconnection have been strongly correlated with voting for populist and extremist parties and extremists

can weaponize these issues as countries previously bonded by history and ethnicity become more diverse. Without new connections and a way of alleviating growing anxiety over changing identity our liberal democratic system will be weakened.

The problem has shifted from a narrow question of integrating ethnic minorities into a wider question about how to build meaningful communities for everyone. Politicians know, just as we all do, that many of our communities feel weaker, less connected and more divided that they were. Yet despite the pressing need for action, despite almost annual commissions and inquiries setting out similar roadmaps and despite embryonic strategies; a serious approach to integration and community cohesion has never been sustained.

The pandemic has highlighted the problem. But it has also opened up an opportunity—increasing the value we place on community and a desire to do something about it.

Methodology

This section of the report seeks to understand the political landscape on integration and connection issues through the eyes of decision makers and those close to them. It is interested in understanding the political constraints that have led to decades of policy neglect.

Almost one hundred key witnesses were interviewed from former Prime Ministers, Home Secretaries and other Secretaries of State to faith leaders, civil servants, academics and practitioners. These were semi structured interviews and conducted on the basis of confidentiality. Most of the interviews were face to face, some were over the phone or via video conference. Below I try to reflect the content of the interviews and the views expressed. They are not my views except where I make recommendations. The interviewees are heavily skewed towards elite policy makers because the formation of, and obstacles to, national policy making was the question I was considering.

Interview List (some interviewees have asked not to be named):

- Amber Rudd (former Home Secretary)
- Andrew Gwynne MP (former Shadow MHCLG)
- Carol Gilchrist (Head of Local Integrated Partnerships, Kirklees)
- Charles Clarke (former Home Secretary)
- Chris Clarke (Author)
- Chuka Umunna (former MP and chair of APPG on Integration)
- David Blunkett (former Home Secretary)
- David Cameron (former PM)
- David Goodhart (Author and Policy Exchange)
- David Lammy MP (Shadow Justice Secretary)
- Dawn Butler MP
- Ed Miliband MP (Shadow Business and Energy Secretary, former

leader of the Opposition)
- Eric Pickles (former chair of the Conservative Party)
- Eric Kaufmann (Academic)
- George Freeman MP
- Hardip Begol (former senior official MHCLG)
- Harun Khan (Muslim Council of Britain)
- Harvey Redgrave (CREST Advisory)
- Hazel Blears (former Secretary of State for DCLG)
- Iain Duncan Smith MP (former Conservative party leader)
- Jack Straw (former Home Secretary)
- Jacqui Smith (former Home Secretary)
- John Biggs (Mayor of Tower Hamlets)
- John Denham (former Secretary of State for DCLG)
- Jon Cruddas MP
- Jon Yates (co-founder The Challenge)
- Julie Harrison (National Lottery, NI)
- Justine Greening (Former MP and Education Secretary)
- Lisa Nandy MP (Shadow Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
- Louise Casey (Former Government Tzar and Author of the Casey Review)
- Margaret Hodge MP
- Matt Ilic (former No 10 Special Advisor)
- Matthew Lever (former No 10 Policy advisor)
- Matthew Taylor (RSA)
- Michael Gove MP (Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
- Monina O'Prey (Social Change Initiative)
- Muhammed Abdul Bari (Muslim Council of Britain)
- Naz Shah MP
- Nick Lowles (Hope not Hate)
- Nick Pearce (former Head of No 10 policy unit)
- Nick Timothy (Former Chief of Staff to Theresa May)
- Paul Embery (Blue Labour)
- Paul Thomas (Huddersfield University)
- Phoebe Griffiths (IPPR)
- Polly Mackenzie (Demos)
- Professor Joanne Hughes (Queen's University Belfast)
- Rabbi Jonathan Sacks (Former Chief Rabbi)
- Robin Tuddenham (Calderdale Council CEO)
- Ruth Kelly (former Secretary of State for DCLG)
- Sayeeda Warsi (former chair of the Conservative Party)
- Salma Shah (Sajid Javid's former SPAD)
- Sara Khan (Extremism Commissioner)
- Sara Skodbo (Former Head of Prevent)
- Sarah Mulley (GLA, Execuitive Director Communities and Skills)
- Simon Woolley (Operation Black Vote)

- Sunder Katwala (British Future)
- Ted Cantle (Integration expert)
- Tim Montgomerie (Conservative commentator)
- Tom Tugendhat MP (Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee)
- Tony Blair (former PM)
- Trevor Phillips (Former chair of EHRC)
- Will Storr (Author)
- Yvette Cooper MP (Shadow Home Secretary)

Why integration matters

It has been traditional to see integration as about how the majority community integrates new or minority communities into it. There have been ongoing debates about both the best way of achieving this and whether the state should be ultimately aiming for assimilation, integration or multicultural outcomes.

In the past this may have made sense. However, over the last 30 years the nature of the challenge has shifted and grown. At its core is the reality that our social connections have dissipated across our whole society. We are no longer facing a challenge of how minority groups are integrated into majority connections, because so many of those connections in the majority community have broken down. We are now faced instead with a dual challenge. Firstly, how do we build community connections across our society as a whole, and secondly how do we make sure these connections reflect the make-up of our society and contribute to a civic rather than an ethnic identity? This wider challenge is bigger in both scope and in nature.

In 1971 three million people in the UK lived alone, today that number is closer to eight million. 21% of people in England say they are sometimes, often, or always lonely (ONS 2016/17). The effects of this isolation are not marginal. If you are lonely you have a 29% higher risk of coronary heart disease, 32% higher risk of stroke and 64% higher risk of clinical dementia. All in all you are 30% more like to die prematurely.[1]

While we are still understanding the full physical and mental health implications of loneliness and social isolation, there is little doubt of their severity and their breadth.

The rise of loneliness and social isolation at the individual level has been accompanied by a wider reduction in connections at a community level. Our membership of clubs and associations has fallen, attendance at everything from local pubs to churches has nosedived. Community centres and libraries have closed, high streets have declined.

All of this impedes the healthy functioning of both society and economy and the connections and trust that's needed to underpin both. It also creates areas of extremely low social capital, cut off from the wider economy the so-called left behind places.

While community connections have withered at almost every level, it's worth noting that the most recent data suggest that the Covid crisis has

1. Hertz, Lonely Century, p17.

begun to tell a different story. A recent report from the Together campaign (of which the author is a co-founder) based on input from over 150,000 people found that the crisis has begun to rekindle community connections and spark a new desire for closer communities. Could Covid be the prompt that starts a renewed upswing in community connections?

Political scientist Robert Putnam distinguished between 'bonding' issues such as loneliness and social disconnection within groups, and 'bridging' questions, notably how to integrate groups across ethnic and political lines. The debate about how we build community connection involves both bonding and bridging. It can no longer start and end with bridging questions about the integration of minority groups. Such an approach wouldn't fit either the scale of the problem or the best approach to it. The challenge of community connection is no longer primarily an inter group one, it's a whole society problem, involving how all of us bond with others.

This does not mean the issue of integration between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority has gone away. That mission has, in fact, become more significant for the obvious reason that minority ethnic groups have grown in the UK and are going to continue to do so.

According to the 1991 ONS census 6.7% of the UK population was born overseas, by 2011 it had nearly doubled to 12%. Between 2001 and 2011 the proportion of British people identifying as White British fell from 88% to 82%, and according to the analysis in chapter two it has now fallen below 80%. Today nearly a quarter of all British school children are from an ethnic minority background.[2]

Our integration challenge at the macro level is personified in our own networks. Around half of the population say that they have no friends outside of their own ethnic group. These divides are deepest between Muslims and non-Muslims with nine out of ten non-Muslims having no close Muslim friends. Four out of ten have never had close contact with any Muslim person ever. At the same time, one in five Muslims has not entered a non-Muslim's house in the last year.[3]

Most of those interviewed for this project shared the concern that the task of integration was growing not shrinking. One senior council official interviewed said: "We are definitely on the cusp of things getting far worse, segregation, single sex/single faith schools, rise of the far right that people aren't recognising, growth in migration. This isn't going away".

The anxiety about integration isn't simple. It will be fed by the visible reality of minority groups clustering for social and economic reasons, we also know that about half the white population worries about having 'too many' people from minority backgrounds in their area.[4]

Some of the anxieties about integration will be based on actual segregation and in other cases assumptions about it, some of those fed by prejudice. What is interesting is that concerns over integration may also be a proxy for wider concern about loss of community connections. It is perhaps easier to blame others for undermining community rather than examining the behaviour and culture of the majority community itself.

2. Ibid, p 30.
3. Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere, p41.

Whatever the drivers, it's clear that integration must be a core component of any serious strategy to rebuild community connections and that we should be able to do so in a way that moves beyond the tired debates of how much diversity is a good thing, to a more productive and unifying focus on how to ensure contact and integration. Here there is much more consensus, as Rutger Bregman summarises, "Contact works. Few findings in the social sciences have this much evidence to back them up. Contact engenders more trust, more solidarity and more mutual kindness. It helps you see the world through other people's eyes. Moreover it changes you as a person because, individuals with a diverse group of friends are more tolerant towards strangers. and contact is contagious: when you see a neighbour getting along with others, it makes you rethink your own biases".[5]

Questions of how we live together have gone from marginal to central questions in modern politics. Identity, belonging, our sense of place have become more important than arguments about aggregate GDP. Both left and right have been slow to respond to this. The populist and authoritarian right have been quicker to exploit the gap. Yet that goal of creating a collective civic identity, rather than an ethnic one, remains central.

Many of those interviewed for this study shared the view of a former Prime Minister who said; "Later in my term I started to feel this was one of the most important issues, that there was nothing more important." Alongside this general acceptance of the scale of the challenge is a recognition that we have subjected it to chronic neglect. One former Home Secretary said, "Like climate change, we have buried our heads in the sand".

The opportunity for this is now. Covid has not only created that opportunity (alongside all its attendant pain) but it has set us on a new trajectory. In May 2020, 60% of the public agreed that the response to Covid had shown the unity of our society more that its divides, just 15% disagreed. Even by December 2020 still 50% felt that (Talk Together). 73% said they would like our society to be closer and more connected in the future. This appetite is rooted in optimism with 64% of people agreeing that despite our differences most people have a lot in common.

Why haven't we done more?

In order to develop good public policy in any particular area you first need two foundations; a clear understanding of the problem and a clear definition of what success looks like. Global temperatures rising is the problem, stopping that rise is the objective. That doesn't mean that these foundations are enough to guarantee success, far from it, but without them they do guarantee failure.

The problem with questions of community connection and integration is that we don't have these foundations. One policy thinker interviewed said: "What is the definition of cohesion which means we've won? We all have very different views of this". Another added: "It's hard to describe success and hard to measure, it's philosophically hard to define".

4. Bregman, Humankind, p 358

One local elected official said this lack of agreement on outcomes meant success could be defined as failure and vice versa. The point was made that in some areas there have been such high degrees of physical separation of ethnic groups that there is no longer community tension, because people simply don't engage with each other. If lack of conflict or tension is your measure of success this could be chalked us a victory, but if integrated living is your objective it's an abject failure.

This lack of common language and objectives emasculates the policy debate before it has started. Politicians talk past each other; local government defines the challenge in contrasting ways.

Alongside the lack of common reference points interviewees also spoke about a set of institutional impediments to change. Perhaps most important of these was the lack of a consistent national picture, especially when talking about integration. All of the former Home Secretaries interviewed identified this as a major challenge, one said: "The core problem is it's very difficult to see integration as a national issue. It's local".

Both politicians and officials worried that talking about it nationally wasn't just ineffective, it could be actively counterproductive. A former Home Secretary said: "These issues feel very different depending on where you are: Rotherham versus Tunbridge Wells, so it's hard to have a single collective national conversation. Indeed, even trying to do so might be counter-productive."

A senior civil servant echoed this sentiment: "Politicians worried that they could make it worse by talking about it, how do you talk about it nationally when it can be very localised?"

These local variations and specificities wouldn't necessarily be problematic in other policy areas, but in this area they are fatal for two reasons. Firstly, it's a hugely controversial policy area and therefore without national political direction or impetus most councils will choose to shy away from it. One council official said, "Off the record, locally people talk about it being an issue but the council don't take it seriously". A former Home Office minster agreed saying, "Local government shies away from the controversy." Many of the areas with significant integration problems are led by councils for whom segregation and integration are seen as marginal issues.

Secondly there is no capacity in councils to take it forward. This is partly to do with budget cuts but it also reflects a wider shift in most councils away from community development. Council leaders interviewed talked about having no expertise to draw upon, and council staff said they had no capacity to work with. One senior official said: "Only a few councils now have staff working on community development. It used to be a key part of local government." Another national level official said "Local government has completely vacated the ground for communities".

This combination of a strong central government desire to delegate the challenge (see the underwhelming government response to the Casey review), combined with an equally strong desire locally to avoid the challenge and a lack of any capacity to engage with it creates stasis. A

former party leader said: "This has to be a national debate, local level won't have permission, will be scared and will back off."

And this is not the only structural challenge. Another structural impediment was central government infrastructure. One former minister summarized it simply if brutally: "The Home Office is incompetent, MHCLG fringe and under-funded." The lack of leadership capacity in this area came up consistently across interviews. A former Home Secretary said; "No one takes responsibility, MHCLG has a huge amount of turnover". This lack of leadership is even more central because it's a cross government challenge. Cohesion and integration sit across government yet none of the departments have the capacity, desire or ability to take on that cross-government leadership role.

These barriers are compounded by the unavoidably glacial rate of change in this area. There are no quick fixes. With politicians held accountable on 4/5-year cycles, what is the incentive to start something that won't deliver in the short term? This structural problem acts as a major disincentive to political engagement. It leads to a yo-yoing of political attention, one official in local government said, "You get a little bit of money thrown at it then it disappears". A senior Conservative former cabinet member agreed "Westminster is rubbish at taking long term decisions, these issues don't have a deadline."

A high profile campaigner for community cohesion explained the conundrum, "It would take a serious political intervention and commitment to get change. Why would someone commit to spending the money when they won't benefit from it?" A Conservative MP agreed, "It doesn't show success quickly. If it's hard to prove, it's easy to drop".

The lack of political commitment, slow returns and political controversy have led to the wrong tools being used. Central government has focussed on small scale technocratic solutions that have project-ised what is a systemic problem. We have often devolved responsibility without devolving the power needed to make a difference.

This frustration is evident at practitioner level. A council official from a northern town said: "We can do cohesion projects all day everyday but it's not sustainable. If we don't break down segregated communities we'll have to do this forever." Another added that it felt futile, "It's like being on a hamster wheel".

A former Prime Minister recognised the same problem: "The tough questions are schools, housing, immigration, you start with wild enthusiasm then look at the policies that stem from it and say 'oh Christ do I really need to do that'". That realisation has meant government has too often stepped back from the challenge.

According to MHCLG officials the department (now the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities) stopped prioritising cohesion in 2010 because it couldn't show its impact and austerity meant departments were pushed to stick to their core business. This lack of leadership is felt at a local level, one local elected official described it as "the biggest danger." Their view was that without that leadership and a

more compelling national narrative nothing substantial will change and the drift will continue.

A Home Secretary summarized the challenge: "It feels like a poisoned chalice. Long timelines, multi department approach and lack of definition about what we mean and controversial policy areas, are all real brakes on strategic action. It's seen as unclear, potentially messy and with indeterminate benefits."

Lack of a lobby and Tory/Labour inhibitions

Structural barriers exist in every area of policy. While it is true that they may be more profound in this area than in many others, what happens in most other areas of policy is that as a challenge becomes more intense the pressure for change gradually mounts until it overcomes the structural problems. This happens sooner when there is an effective and organised lobby for change.

One of the things that all interviewees agreed on was that they felt no bottom-up pressure. There was a common feeling that there has been no effective or consistent lobby. A senior treasury official summed it up, "We have felt zero pressure to do anything about this, quite the opposite".

This comes from two dynamics. There are very few organisations that specialise in either integration or wider community building. Those that exist tend to have high degrees of expertise but very limited capacity. Until recently there has been no effective attempt to aggregate these small organisations into an effective lobby. This has been intensified by the underinvestment in this area. The decline in council engagement has also reduced the professional specialisation in this area that could have become a bedrock of engagement. Secondly and even more importantly, the organisations which do most in this area and which would be the most powerful advocates often don't see this as being at the centre of their mission or mandate, the football clubs and local pubs, the faith groups and youth groups, they all exist for a different purpose and campaign or lobby on their core mission. Their impact on community cohesion and integration is often a by-product of what they do. In some cases it's seen as an important by product, in others as an incidental one. But in almost no cases is it the central component of their strategy and thus gets less attention, capacity and resources.

This situation is not one simply of neglect however, the pressure that often does exist is organised around campaigns for special treatment, separation or opt outs. Organised lobby groups from developers to different community groups often spend their time arguing for *separation*. Many of those interviewed said the pressure they felt was much more likely to come from groups arguing for faith schools or against the requirements to integrate social housing within more expensive developments. At a local level there would often be active community resistance to attempts at better integration.

The exception to this comes not from an organised lobby but more directly from public opinion. A former Prime Minister explained that

community cohesion only tended to surface as a political issue through two perceived crises: immigration and terrorism. While these were driven by public concern and media coverage, they are of course a very partial element of the wider picture and tended to draw policy into narrower solutions to the wider challenge (more on this below).

The political dynamics of cohesion and integration cannot be ignored. Both of the main Westminster parties are saddled with historic legacies and ideological baggage that makes tackling these issues difficult. For the Conservative party it's the long tail of the 'nasty party', the term coined by Theresa May. When it comes to integration and minority communities it's not simply about fears of being a nasty party but a racist one. Conservative politicians interviewed for this study freely admitted the challenge.

Firstly many of them felt, as encapsulated by a Conservative former Home Secretary that it was simply "less of an issue in Conservative areas". This reduced political incentives to engage, but, as fundamentally, it also reduced knowledge of the subject and thus comfort in engaging in it. Both integration and declining cohesion was seen as a problem primarily for poorer areas that they didn't traditionally represent.

Secondly, given their historic positions Conservative politicians worried that their actions, even if "driven by the best of intentions" would be interpreted as racist. A former leader of the party said "we were always frightened that we would be called racist". Another former Home Secretary agreed, "We weren't sure how we could design a policy that wouldn't look racist." This concern has not gone away and it is clearly both one of perceptions and in some cases reality. Conservative MPs acknowledged that racism, and especially anti-Muslim prejudice, remains a factor in parts of the Conservative Party. While there may have been a general decline in racist attitudes and much greater minority representation at the top of the Tory party, events like the Windrush scandal and previous remarks widely regarded as racist by the current Prime Minister help to keep alive the suspicion of racial bias.

External analysts shared the view, both that the label of racism created political paralysis but also that lack of knowledge, especially of minority communities, increased Tory reticence unnecessarily, "Conservatives think migrants and minorities will resist, but in fact they are very keen on integration."

The wider challenge and perhaps an even more fundamental one is ideological. While 'choice' has been co-opted as an ideological banner by many groups (including New Labour), it is felt most keenly by Conservatives. The mantra of choice for many Conservatives covers every element of policy from housing to health, education to transport. In perhaps the most revealing conversations for this study some of the leading political figures associated with Conservatism over the last decade hinted that putting 'choice' on a pedestal made issues of community cohesion difficult, perhaps impossible to address.

Some of the most influential voices in the party began to quietly put the case that choice would need to be balanced with other priorities if

Conservatives were going to make an impact on community cohesion. While this view is mainly held at very senior levels and is far from clearly articulated even here, it does connect to older notions of pre-Thatcher conservativism, a traditional conservativism more rooted in communities and perhaps given a new lease of life in "red wall conservatism".

The Labour Party's challenges to engaging properly with debates about cohesion and integration are different but as daunting to overcome. Once again they are both political and ideological. According to Labour MPs interviewed the political challenge comes from a political reliance on minority voters in particular areas of the country. While in theory this might incentivise engagement in integration given high levels of support from minority voters, perceptions and local realities often block this.

A senior Labour MP from a minority background said "It's very hard to get people to talk about race and religion, it's like walking on a slippery surface carrying a vase." But Labour politicians felt it was particularly difficult for them because "the voting coalition that makes up the Labour Party stands in the way of dealing with this. We don't want to offend the communities by challenging the lack of integration." A former Labour adviser said: "The left finds it very hard to talk about this stuff, antiracism means not being willing to talk about it, they think the more you talk about it the more you fuel it."

Civil servants detected the same reticence, one said, "Labour is propped up by minority votes in north, this has created an unspoken decision not to pursue integration policies".

Beyond the electoral coalition constraints on integration policy, there is also an ideological anxiety that effects both integration policy and wider cohesion. One Labour MP said, "Too many of us think dealing with inequality will deal with this problem, but that's rubbish." This split was evident in the interviews with some on the left of the party essentially seeing challenges of integration and community cohesion as synonymous with economic debates about inequality. While others, those more on the centre or right of the party, as well as most of the ethnic minority members interviewed thought that while inequality is an element of the problem, it goes much deeper and that such a reductive analysis was stopping Labour understanding questions of identity.

The rare times that cohesion or specifically integration would come to the top of political agendas it was driven, as already noted, by one of two things; immigration or terrorism. All of the former Home Secretaries and Prime Ministers acknowledged this. The problem is that these are hugely distorting prisms, like only dealing with defence policy by looking at aircraft carriers; big and attention seeking, but only a small part of the whole picture.

At a national level those interviewed accepted this limitation and were open about their mistakes in blurring the lines, especially with terrorism/ extremism. A former Prime Minister said: "We have been over focused on Islamist issues, we need to keep cohesion and terror separate". Officials also accept this failing, that while after terror attacks cohesion would be

pushed up the agenda, it "confused" the agenda and led to an aggregate decline in engagement over time. At a local level this led to groups keen on community cohesion standing back because they were worried about ulterior motives.

The extremism frame has also helped centre discussions on the British Muslim community. Across party and including some officials there was a view articulated that, at its most extreme; "We don't have an issue with community cohesion, we have a problem with Muslims". At least one interviewee seemed obviously prejudiced in their views. The most often cited justification was that cultural and or religious factors meant that while "Most communities at second and third generations become quite British, that's not so true with British Muslims. Their culture is bound up with religion".

What was surprising was the sense of exceptionalism that some senior politicians ascribed to the Muslim community and the willingness to talk about all Muslim communities as a homogeneous entity. It is certainly true that Muslim communities do often live somewhat more separately than other minorities in parts of the UK, but it's also true that anti-Muslim prejudice remains much higher than most other forms of discrimination (see EMBES survey finding 44% of white British people objecting a lot or a little to a close relative marrying a Muslim) and few of those citing the particular issue of Muslim integration took that into account. What was clear was that focussing so narrowly on Muslim integration post 2005 had distorted the integration agenda. Most interviewees agreed that the blurring of lines between integration, community cohesion and counter extremism was making it harder to engage in the questions properly.

Conclusions

The research for this study found a huge amount of consensus, more than expected. At the most basic level there was a shared view that the loss of connection in so many communities was of huge importance and that our politics was complicit in neglect of a growing problem. The explanations for this neglect were partly definitional and semantic, about long timelines and limited evidence. These were exacerbated by ideological and political barriers and obscured by dominant distorting prisms. Meanwhile the countervailing forces, those arguing for focus and action have been too weak and disorganized to provide the impetus needed. There was a shared view that wider community cohesion and debates about integration were inseparable and that to try to address one without the other would be unsuccessful.

The danger is that without a change to the status quo, this set of issues will fester and re-emerge only at crisis point. When it gets to this point the centrifugal forces that will have built up will be hard to contain. Polarisation, segregation, loss of community institutions all create dynamics that with momentum create a cycle of separation. As one cohesion expert said: "We have to make progress now, in 15 years it will be too late." But it isn't too late yet. In fact, not only is it not too late, we have the biggest opportunity

we have had since the Second World War to address them.

The aftermath of the Brexit referendum and the Covid pandemic both create moments of national introspection about the type of country we want to be and the communities we want to build. These are generational moments that could change dynamics and create an opportunity to change direction. Those interviewed for the study who follow cohesion trends in other countries were clear that the only time these issues were elevated to the top of political agendas was when they had been bound up with debates about national renewal. We are unlikely to get a better chance than this.

There are also green shoots of progress since 2016 that lend encouragement. While the response to the Casey review was anaemic, the integration pilots showed real local results. Post-Brexit changes to immigration policy and the subsequent decline in hostility to immigration point towards the ability to progress on even the most contentious of policy issues. And the schemes responding to refugees from Syria, Hong Kong, Afghanistan and now Ukraine promise better integration outcomes. Finally, the levelling up debate, has opened up discussions about social capital and social connection, and widened the discussion about integration to include arguments about geography, education and class.

Against these green shoots, the controversy around the Sewell report and the polarised reaction to BLM protests in 2020 showed how divisive debates about race can still be.

To seize the wider opportunity we first need to accept that integration and wider community cohesion are inseparable. This needs to be framed as an 'everyone issue', not a question of them and us. Secondly it will require sustained political prioritization at the highest levels. Given the nature of the barriers that have to be overcome: controversy, long timelines, cross departmental working, low central and local government capacity, if this isn't a Prime Ministerial priority, it isn't a priority at all.

Chapter Two: The new data on residential segregation

By Richard Webber and Eric Kaufmann

Introduction and methodology

As Brendan Cox has noted, bridging across social groups is an important aspect of social cohesion in Britain, and residential integration of ethnic groups is a core element of this. Here we attempt to take the temperature of residential integration in Britain. The country has clearly become more diverse since 2011. But which communities have grown the fastest and where? Are we becoming more or less segregated than we were ten years ago? Assuming everything goes according to plan, the ONS will reveal the answers to these questions some time in 2023.

But in this section of the report we can give a preliminary assessment of the direction of travel and the key trends since 2011.

The evidence we present is derived from a pair of databases containing the names and postcodes of virtually all UK adults over the age of 18, one sourced from Experian in March 2011, the other from the REaD Group in March 2021.

In order to preview the likely results of the 2021 census, and patterns of change since 2011, we use specialist software called Origins to infer the ethnic heritage of population groups from their names. (Origins and the two data files on which the results of this report are based are supplied to us by Webber Phillips Ltd.)

The Origins name-based classification differs in important respects from ONS data which means that while they both pick up similar trends, the absolute numbers can differ, sometimes substantially. Most important the ONS data includes people of all ages while Origins, as indicated, only counts adults of 18 or over. Origins does not include mixed race categories but is sensitive to more nuanced ethnic variations, with 44 ethnic categories compared with the ONS 18.

The Origins analysis also uses a measure for the Index of Segregation that differs from the standard ONS-based Index of Dissimilarity.

What's In A Name?

The term "not white-British" is designed to include all adults whose combination of personal and family names suggest that they are either of non-white or of non-British ancestry. This population includes white people of Western and Eastern European heritage, people of Jewish and Armenian heritage and also people of Black and Asian heritage.

The numbers for any individual category will not necessarily match those used by the ONS. One reason is that information based on names tends to be backward looking, surnames, in particular, reflecting patrimonial heritage by contrast with individually filled-in survey respondents who define themselves according to current self-identification and future aspiration.

A second difference is in the categories used. Whereas survey based statistics mostly rely on categories defined in terms of national jurisdiction, the names that people bear can often be better interpreted in terms of religion (such as Sikh, Jewish) or language. Some of the name based categories used in this report, such as Mandarin Chinese and Tamil, are more granular than survey-based ones, others, such as Spanish speaking Latin America, are coarser. Some reflect cultural and ethnic divisions rather than territorial, such as the category Albanian which includes migrants from Kosovo and Hindu Indian which includes most members of the Ugandan Asian community.

The count of the Black Caribbean community is upweighted to compensate for the disproportionate number of Black West Indians who bear British names. Adults whose names imply Irish heritage are classified as white British. Caution needs to be exercised when making direct comparisons between these results and those from census-based analyses.

The Story So Far, Plus Key New Finding

The Origins name-based demographic analysis by Webber Phillips differs in important respects from ONS data but also points to a high degree of continuity in the demographic trends tracked by ONS between 1971 and the last census in 2011.

For instance, the White British share of the population continues to decline at a slow but steady rate. According to ONS in 2001, 88 percent of the British population was White British. This fell by around 6 points between the 2001 and 2011 censuses. Our Origins data suggest a further decline of 3 points in this share between 2011 and 2021, which would represent a slowing of the pace of ethnic change compared to the 2001-11 period. This is consistent with other work based on the Annual Population Survey (Migration Watch 2021).

As with previous ONS data, Britain's minority population continues to be highly clustered. There remain 'two Britains'. The not white-British continue to concentrate in urban areas, especially in 'majority-minority' wards. In 2011, almost half of not white-Britons lived in wards that were majority-minority. Meanwhile, 80 percent of wards remained over 90 percent white. Extreme US-style segregation is rare, however, and can generally only be found in former mill towns such as Oldham, Burnley or Blackburn, where segregation remains high.

The positive story is that, as in the 1991-2011 period, not white-Britons are gradually moving out from areas of own-group ethnic

concentration. Virtually all ethnic groups show a modest decline in measures of segregation. Indeed, this suggests most minorities do not wish to self-segregate, but are moving in search of better housing and amenities commensurate with their upward mobility.

However, the less positive aspect of the story is that minorities are tending to move to relatively mixed or even 'superdiverse' places where they encounter other minorities rather than the 8 in 10 wards in the country that are around 90 percent white. There continues to be a small minority flow into a select band of formerly heavily white wards and postcodes, often in affluent suburbs such as Kingston in London or Oadby in Leicestershire, but this does not alter the broad pattern of high minority clustering.

Minorities are becoming less segregated from each other, but barely so from the White British majority. And the one group which appears to have become slightly *more* segregated are the White English. This echoes ONS findings from 1991-2011 which show that the ethnic majority White British have not become less segregated from minority Britons. Minorities are de-segregating, but meeting other minorities in their new locales far more than would be expected from a random distribution of outmigration across the nation's neighbourhoods. White Britons are meeting more minorities in their neighbourhoods as the minority share rises, but when you account for the larger share of minorities, White Britons remain as segregated (i.e. nonrandomly distributed across neighbourhoods) as in previous years.

Where our data show an important *divergence* from previous findings is with respect to ethnic change in London and some other large and diverse cities. London's White British population declined from 71 percent of the total in 1991 to 58 percent in 2001 and 45 percent in 2011 according to the ONS. By contrast, our figures show a drop of only 3 points between 2011 and 2021. Birmingham underwent a similarly rapid ethnic change as London. Yet we find a similar stabilizing of the White British share in Birmingham, Manchester and some other cities.

In addition, the pattern of minorities tending to remain within the city limits of major metropolitan areas like London appears to be shifting. Between 1991 and 2001, around 2 percent more minorities left London than entered it from other parts of England and Wales. For 2001-11 4 percent more minorities left London than entered it from other parts of the country. But this pattern represented a stronger affinity to London than was true for the White British, who had net domestic outmigration from London of 11 percent in the 90s and 13 percent in the 2000s.

This disproportionate propensity of White Britons to leave the city for other parts of the country appears to have slowed while for minorities it has picked up. Hence some of the fastest growth of the not white-British population appears to have taken place beyond the M25 in exurban zones like the Thames Gateway in North Kent and South Essex, and in satellite towns around major cities such as Watford, Swindon, and Corby.

Continuity in Key Trends

The share of the UK adult population bearing names of not white-British origin increased by just under 20% between 2011 and 2021. In 2011 15.4% of adults in the database were not of white British heritage, rising to 18.5% in 2021 (remember this is just adults). These figures are broadly consistent with official estimates of the size of the not white-British adult population. (Note that the adult percentage is significantly lower than the total percentage used by the ONS due in part to the comparatively young age distribution of not white-British residents.)

Here are some other respects in which patterns have shifted between 2011 and 2021:

- The migration of minority communities from inner city neighbourhoods to neighbourhoods of lower income, privately rented housing in middle ring suburbs has led to areas of white British stability or even, in some cases, "recolonization" of inner/central neighbourhoods in London and provincial cities. Think of young, middle class whites in Brixton.
- There has been an increasing bifurcation of the not white-British community between heartland neighbourhoods, each the base of a specific ethnic or religious group, and other more cosmopolitan neighbourhoods populated by residents from a diversity of ethnic backgrounds
- With the exception of Muslim communities, there is a continuing if modest dispersion of the more economically successful members of minority populations into predominantly white (but not lily-white) neighbourhoods in suburban areas or satellite towns
- One of the most enduring features of Britain's demography since 2011 has been the continuing reluctance of minorities to settle in rural or seaside communities. And as noted above, minorities are becoming less segregated from each other, but barely so from the White British majority.

Clearly the overall national increase of 3% in the not white-British share of adult population conceals wide variations. As table 1 and figure 1 illustrate, the fastest increases have occurred in London and in the West Midlands, in particular in boroughs in outer east London and in southeastern satellite towns which have experienced rapid growth of housing, population and jobs in warehousing and distribution.

Table 1: Local authorities with largest increase in % adults with not white-British names, 2011, 2021

Local authority	Increase in % adults not white-British 2011 - 21
Barking and Dagenham	9.94
Luton	8.48
Redbridge	8.10
Watford	7.67
Peterborough	7.65
Blackburn with Darwen	7.55
Pendle	7.49
Corby	7.01
Hillingdon	6.98
Bradford	6.95
Havering	6.93
Oldham	6.81
Birmingham	6.50
Slough	6.45
Harrow	6.35
Thurrock	6.34
Bolton	5.77
Bexley	5.71
Boston	5.69
Sandwell	5.65

Figure 1: Increase in % adults with not white-British names, 2011 – 21



As figure 2 shows, Outer London has experienced rapid minority growth while Inner London has generally remained stable. In Barking and Dagenham, for example, the share of the adult population that is not white-British has grown by 9.9%, in neighbouring Redbridge by 8.1%. Characteristics that contribute to the growth of the not white-British community in Luton, Watford, Peterborough, Harlow, Slough and Thurrock, all high growth areas, are the combination of (relatively) affordable housing and growth in manual and unskilled jobs often related to distribution.

Figure 2: Change in % adults with not white-British names, 2011 – 21, wards, Greater London



Many other places where the not white-British population has increased fastest are former Pennine mill towns with already well established South Asian communities such as Blackburn with Darwen, Pendle, Bradford and Oldham. Compared with southeastern towns natural increase contributes significantly more than migration to the growth of the not white-British population in these places.

Our evidence shows that minorities in these Northern and Midlands towns are likely to be very much more geographically segregated, living "parallel lives" in towns whose postcodes are either mostly not white-British or mostly white British. In London and the South East the minority population is far more likely to live in "melting pot" postcodes, in streets where many different communities live cheek by jowl and which continue to accommodate a residual, albeit declining, white British population. These differences have obvious significance for community development and integration strategies.

Who is Growing and Who is Shrinking?

It is not just a continuation of the growth of people of non-white heritage that characterises the last ten years. It is also the increase in the number of not white-British communities *with a significant presence*. The British minority population is itself more diverse than ever before as well as larger.

The impact of global events on the flow of migrants into Britain is evident when we list minorities which have grown by more than twice the overall national rate of increase in the not white-British adult population as a whole during the past ten years. In descending order of growth these are Romanians (261%), Kashmiris/Afghans (224%), Albanians (106%), Other Black Africans (72%) people from Former Yugoslavia (65%) and

Black South Africans (53%). Since 2011 people of Ethiopian, Baltic and Somali heritage have also increased at more than twice the overall rate of increase of the not white-British population.

Note, in table 2, that the fast growth of the Kashmiri population is partly accounted by the inclusion of adults of Afghan heritage in this category whereas the faster growth of the Black Caribbean population than that recorded in official statistics can be attributed to the absence in the Origins classification of a "mixed race" category into which an increasing number of adults of Black heritage fall.

Table 2: Population groups by % of UK adults, 2011, 2021 and change

	2011	2021	Change (absolute)	Change (as % of 2011)
	%	%	%	
Romanian	0.12	0.42	0.30	261.8
Kashmiris/Afghans	0.25	0.81	0.56	224.2
Albanian	0.06	0.12	0.06	106.3
Other Black African	0.16	0.28	0.12	72.0
Formerly Yugoslav	0.12	0.19	0.08	65.9
Black South African	0.26	0.39	0.14	53.1
Ethiopian	0.02	0.02	0.01	46.7
Baltic States	0.18	0.25	0.08	42.8
Somali	0.11	0.15	0.04	40.6
Bulgarian	0.04	0.05	0.01	38.4
Vietnamese	0.07	0.09	0.02	29.3
Ghanaian	0.23	0.30	0.07	28.7
Spanish	0.53	0.68	0.15	28.0
Tamil or Sri Lankan	0.30	0.38	0.08	25.8
Bangladeshi	0.44	0.55	0.11	24.2
Hungarian	0.15	0.19	0.03	22.5
Other East Asian	0.11	0.13	0.02	22.2
Black Caribbean	0.49	0.60	0.11	22.0
Turkish	0.30	0.36	0.06	21.5
Portugese or Brazilian	0.39	0.47	0.08	21.3
Non white British	15.43	18.45	3.02	19.6
Russian or Ukrainian	0.32	0.37	0.06	18.3
Hindu Indian	1.29	1.49	0.20	15.3
Filipino	0.05	0.06	0.01	14.8
Bangladeshi Hindu	0.01	0.01	0.00	14.6
Nigerian	0.49	0.55	0.07	13.8
Italian or Maltese	0.83	0.94	0.11	12.9
Sikh	0.58	0.65	0.07	12.9
Other Muslim	1.07	1.21	0.13	12.6

Iranian	0.20	0.22	0.02	10.5
North African Muslim	0.26	0.28	0.03	10.0
French or Walloon	0.63	0.68	0.06	9.2
Cantonese Chinese	0.26	0.29	0.02	8.8
Scandinavian	0.31	0.34	0.03	8.0
German	0.89	0.95	0.06	6.8
Pakistani	1.07	1.15	0.07	6.7
Armenian	0.02	0.02	0.00	6.4
Greek or Greek Cypriot	0.28	0.29	0.01	5.2
Jewish	0.20	0.21	0.01	3.3
Dutch or Flemish	0.65	0.66	0.02	2.9
Czech or Slovak	0.24	0.24	0.00	0.4
Polish	1.11	1.09	-0.02	-2.0
Japanese	0.05	0.05	0.00	-9.2
Korean	0.14	0.12	-0.02	-12.8
Mandarin Chinese	0.18	0.15	-0.04	-19.9

A few communities have reduced their presence. Perhaps as a result of Brexit, Covid and the resurgence of the Polish economy, people of Polish heritage make up a smaller proportion of the adult population in 2021 than they did in 2011. Declines have occurred among the proportion of UK adults of Korean, Japanese and Mandarin Chinese (but not Cantonese Chinese) heritage.

The fine distinctions afforded by the Origins classification (unavailable in the census), for instance between Cantonese and Mandarin Chinese, reveal that differences in the rate of population increase are as significant within the broad standard groupings used by the Government as they are between them. Examples are the much faster growth of population of Black South African and Other Black African heritage than of Nigerian heritage; from Kashmir than from Pakistan; from Somalia and Ethiopia than from Muslim North Africa; from Vietnam than from mainland China; from Romania, Albania and from the former Republic of Yugoslavia than from Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Each of these population groups has its particular reasons for settling in Britain, each has its distinctive customs, cultural heritage, employment preferences and even crime patterns. In a hospital, Sikhs, Hindu Indians, Tamils, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis will be found in very different numbers and roles. Differences in outcomes are quickly lost when statistics are rolled up into crude categories such as "South Asian" resulting in inadequate understanding of the needs and preferences of individual communities and their members.

Integration and Segregation: Parallel Lives and Melting Pots

Most people would imagine, and many would hope, that the passing of time would result in minority populations becoming more dispersed with levels of geographical segregation reducing. Heritage would become less influential in determining where people lived.

The degree of segregation between populations is measured and represented in various different ways. Here we are using an index of segregation which locates a population group on a continuum between being geographically dispersed, a low score, and being highly concentrated within a limited set of geographical areas, a high score.

Since 2011 there has been a gentle overall fall in the level of segregation in the UK, apart from the White English (who are however far less segregated than the Scottish, Welsh or Irish). However there are wide variations between communities in both the level of segregation and in how rapidly it has declined since 2011. Table 3 shows how segregated groups are compared to a situation in which they were randomly distributed across the country's and how this has changed between 2011 and 2021. Higher index scores indicate higher segregation.

Table 3: Index of segregation 2011, 2021 and change, Origins groups

	Index of segregation		
	2011	2021	Change
Bulgarian	50.59	51.70	1.11
English	12.31	13.02	0.71
Welsh	29.58	29.45	-0.13
Scottish	35.37	35.14	-0.23
Irish	24.13	23.45	-0.68
Northern Irish	38.81	37.98	-0.82
Kashmiri	61.11	59.46	-1.65
Turkish	49.56	47.90	-1.66
Italian or Maltese	30.04	28.36	-1.69
Bangladeshi Muslim	61.20	59.50	-1.70
Dutch or Flemish	17.64	15.91	-1.73
Other Muslim	54.99	53.15	-1.84
Pakistani	63.52	61.66	-1.86
Somali	64.07	62.21	-1.86
North African Muslim	52.26	50.33	-1.93
Sikh	64.05	62.11	-1.94
Iranian	51.00	48.91	-2.10
French or Walloon	25.67	23.14	-2.53
Hindu Indian	54.87	51.89	-2.98
Portugese or Brazilian	47.84	44.75	-3.08

Nigerian	62.37	59.14	-3.23
Spanish	39.23	35.99	-3.24
Baltic States	46.81	43.57	-3.25
Tamil or Sri Lankan	55.91	52.57	-3.34
German	22.40	18.92	-3.48
Korean	40.03	36.41	-3.62
Greek or Greek Cypriot	49.10	45.45	-3.65
Black South African	45.98	42.27	-3.71
Bangladeshi Hindu	77.18	73.45	-3.73
Hungarian	35.22	31.29	-3.93
Scandinavian	25.29	21.17	-4.12
Ghanaian	64.16	60.00	-4.15
Jewish	43.74	39.46	-4.28
Romanian	50.39	46.02	-4.37
Other East Asian	41.64	36.97	-4.67
Filipino	53.76	49.05	-4.71
Polish	35.07	30.35	-4.72
Cantonese Chinese	39.75	34.74	-5.01
Czech or Slovak	35.53	30.40	-5.14
Other Black African	54.78	49.59	-5.19
Formerly Yugoslav	41.23	36.00	-5.23
Ethiopian	75.29	69.74	-5.55
Russian or Ukrainian	39.72	34.03	-5.70
Armenian	63.81	57.90	-5.91
Albanian	60.89	53.59	-7.30
Black Caribbean	46.16	38.31	-7.84
Japanese	55.32	46.88	-8.44
Vietnamese	55.75	46.68	-9.07
Mandarin Chinese	53.69	42.64	-11.05

Whilst Northern Europeans are the most dispersed, the most segregated are Ethiopians and Bangladeshi Hindus. Among the larger communities it is the Pakistanis, the Sikhs and the Somalis who are the most geographically segregated.

Among Eastern Europeans, the Albanians are the most segregated. Among Asian communities the Turks and the Cantonese Chinese are most dispersed. Overall, Black (mainly non-Muslim) African communities tend to be more dispersed than Muslim ones.

Since 2011 the groups that have dispersed the fastest are the Mandarin Chinese, Vietnamese, Black Caribbeans and Albanians. Communities where the process of dispersal has proved the slowest include almost all the Muslim categories (other than Albanians) and Sikhs, all communities which started the period with relatively high levels of segregation. The data suggest that the desire for proximity to a place of worship may act as a brake on the speed of dispersion. Location decisions for such houses of

worship may offer a potential tool for policymakers who seek integration, but only if this does not contravene people's right to freedom of association and contract.

Whilst table 3 reveals overall levels of segregation for each population group in relation to a random sprinkling across wards, segregation indices can also be calculated for any pair of populations in relation to each other. The latter measures how much members of the groups would have to move to be randomly distributed among each other.

Table 4 shows that not white-British populations are more segregated from the white British population than they are from other populations. Segregation between white and non-white is higher than segregation between particular not white-British groupings. In other words members of minorities are living in areas occupied by other minorities, more so than they are in areas that are overwhelmingly white. The slowest improvement in mixing is between the Hindu and Muslim populations.

Table 4: Segregation indices for pairs of communities

	Index of segregation		
	2011	2021	change
White vs non-white	54.99	53.61	-1.38
Hindu vs Muslim	39.41	38.74	-0.67
Bangladeshi vs Pakistani	34.44	33.19	-1.25
Black vs South Asian	38.53	36.99	-1.54

Overall from this and other evidence it seems that the dispersion that is occurring among the not white-British population arises from moves to other neighbourhoods with significant ethnic minority populations more than to the 8 in 10 English wards that average 90 percent white.

In addition to differences in the level of segregation of different minorities we find important differences when we compare the ethnic composition of individual local authorities with that of the UK as a whole. The most diverse local authorities tend to score highest on this index, in as much as heavily diverse wards will look very different to the UK's modal ward, and thus register a high score.

Figure 3: Local authorities by change in level of dissimilarity to the UK, 2011 - 2021 (high negative scores = becoming more similar to the UK). Redder shades indicate convergence, bluer shades divergence, with the UK average.



By 2021 the ethnic profile of the most diverse local authorities had become somewhat more similar to the UK's average ward minority share than was true in 2011.

Figure 3 shows that this trend is particularly marked in London, where Newham, Brent and Harrow were the three authorities whose ethnic composition shifted most toward the national average. This is mainly the result of these wards being the most unusually diverse in 2011, and thus having little room to diverge even further from the average. Though these places remain extremely diverse in 2021, other parts of the country have diversified more quickly, drawing the most diverse places closer to the new national average.

By contrast, much less progress was made towards similarity with the UK profile in wards in Pennine authorities. Very little, if any, convergence with the national average was achieved in Pendle, Blackburn with Darwen,

Oldham, Bolton, Burnley and Kirklees. The principal reason for this is the limited dispersion of ethnic minorities from these local authorities in relation to their minority natural increase; or of movement of white Britons into them. This is a pattern we see in local authorities characterised by the presence of a single or very few minority populations. Why there should be so little improvement in the southern towns of Watford and High Wycombe we have not been able to investigate.

Origins allows us to examine finer-grained residential patterns than is possible in the census. Maps of Luton and Rochdale (figures 4 and 5) show very clear differences in levels of minority concentration in Pennine and South Eastern towns despite a similar not white-British share of the total population. Whereas Luton has few postcodes which contain fewer than 20% not white-British adults, figure 5 shows that in Rochdale the mainly Muslim non-white population remains heavily concentrated in just a few postcodes and, one would suppose, is far more likely to live in "parallel lives" communities with low levels of engagement either with other minorities or with the white British population. These maps are based on data from 2019.

Figure 4: % not white-British adults, Luton postcodes, 2019



Figure 5: % not white-British adults, Rochdale postcodes, 2019



The statistics for 2021 show a clear propensity for minority communities in northern mill town local authorities to live in neighbourhoods characterised by "parallel lives" whilst minority communities in London tend to live in superdiverse "melting pot" neighbourhoods. Figure 6 illustrates the street-level concentration of Muslim names in Rochdale.

Figure 6: Muslim names, Rochdale postcodes, 2019, as a % of all adults



Figure 7 presents a map at local authority level, of the chance of two not white-British residents selected randomly within a postcode belonging to the same minority ethnic group based on the ancestry of their name. High values indicate a prevalence within the local authority of "parallel lives" neighbourhoods, low values "melting pot" neighbourhoods. On the basis of this calculation, areas of greatest heterogeneity within the non-white population tend to be found mostly in northeast London. By contrast it is local authorities with large Hindu Indian populations in the northwest of the city where there is the highest own-group homogeneity at neighbourhood level within the not white-British population.

Figure 7: Diversity within the not white-British population, 2021



Another pattern that can be teased out from the data is the emergence of communities of economically successful members of black and Asian minority communities. We have identified the epicentres of three such areas, shown in figure 8. These are Oadby and Wigston, a prestigious set of communities to the South East of Leicester with a large Ugandan Asian population; Harrow and South West Hertfordshire, exurban London areas popular with Hindu Asians; and parts of the London Boroughs of Kingston and Surbiton, where a large and successful Tamil population has settled.

Figure 8: Location of high income wards with 15% or more adults not white-British, London and South East England



Notwithstanding the cosmopolitan mix of London, figure 9 shows that there are distinct parts of the capital which each minority can consider its heartland – even if such areas do not contain a majority from the ethnic group in question. Our data suggests that the trend towards the suburbanisation of these heartlands is much stronger among the more economically successful communities: Jews, Hindu Asians and Greek Cypriots for example, than it is among those more subject to deprivation.

Figure 9: Heartlands of different communities, London wards based on largest not white-British group



The map of Brent in figure 10 shows that patterns of separation of minority heartlands exist even within a single borough. In Brent, Hindu Indians are the largest minority in postcodes in the north of the borough, Black Caribbeans in the South West and Muslims and Eastern Europeans in the East. Finer ethnic detail would show that in 2021 the north of Brent together with neighbouring parts of Barnet and Harrow forms Britain's largest heartland of people of Romanian heritage, along with neighbouring postcodes in Barnet and Harrow. This information we believe to be important for community development and for communication programmes within the NHS.

Figure 10: Heartlands of different communities, Brent postcodes



Access to finer ethnic categories and geographic scales helps to identify the tendency of different minorities to move out along particular radial corridors from their earlier heartlands. An example, shown in figure 11, is

the migration of the Nigerian community between 2011 and 2021 along the south bank of the Thames from Southwark and Lewisham into Bexley, Dartford and Gravesend.

Figure 11: Change in % adults with Nigerian names, 2011 – 21, lower Thames corridor



We have used the terms melting pots and parallel lives to distinguish groups who tend to live in neighbourhoods where they are the sole significant minority as against those who live in truly multi-ethnic areas. How can we define them and map them with accuracy?

The Postcode Mix

As noted, Origins' surnames-based analysis offers a finer-grained geographic perspective than the census, based on the postcode level. Overall, 29% of the UK adult population and 70% of the UK's not white-British adult population live in postcodes where 20% or more adults bear not white-British names. These we refer to as *significantly ethnic postcodes*.

Local authorities differ radically in the proportion of their adult population living in significantly ethnic postcodes. Newham is the local authority with the highest proportion of its adult residents living in significantly ethnic postcodes, 99.5%. Brent and Harrow likewise have hardly any postcodes which could be described as primarily white British in character.

The ranking of local authority districts by percentage of adults in significantly ethnic postcodes is subtly but significantly different from the ranking by percentage of not white-British adults. Table 5 shows London boroughs having a higher proportion of their residents living in significantly ethnic postcodes than do non-London authorities with a similarly sized not white-British population. For instance, Birmingham is 1 point less white British than Wandsworth yet contains 20 points fewer people living in significantly ethnic postcodes. Leicester and Hackney differ by only 1 point in minority share, but the former has 14 points fewer people living in significantly ethnic postcodes. Whereas Bradford's adult population is 34.7% not white-British compared with Thurrock's 23.2%

they have similar percentages of their residents living in significantly ethnic postcodes.

Clearly the density of non-white Britons living in significantly ethnic postcodes in Leicester and Bradford is much higher than in Wandsworth and Thurrock. White and non-white populations are less micro-segregated in London and the South East than in the Midlands and the North.

Table 5: Local authorities with over 60% of residents living in significantly ethnic postcodes

Local Authority	% adults in significantly ethnic postcodes	% adults not white-British
Newham	99.49	70.46
Brent	98.62	66.12
Harrow	98.02	64.28
Ealing	97.11	59.16
Barking and Dagenham	96.75	49.13
Hackney	96.71	53.08
Slough	96.47	58.74
Tower Hamlets	96.09	59.90
Haringey	95.86	54.27
Redbridge	95.79	61.83
Enfield	95.76	54.53
Barnet	95.63	54.74
Waltham Forest	95.03	52.67
Hounslow	94.91	57.49
Kensington and Chelsea	94.05	48.99
Hammersmith and Fulham	92.94	42.60
Southwark	92.84	46.74
Lewisham	92.69	41.25
Merton	92.52	44.05
Camden	92.36	47.22
Lambeth	92.02	43.56
Islington	91.38	42.13
Westminster	88.45	53.56
Luton	88.06	48.32
Hillingdon	86.28	44.60
Croydon	85.89	41.24
Greenwich	84.81	41.31
Wandsworth	83.88	36.70
Leicester	82.62	51.55
Kingston upon Thames	79.76	35.00
Watford	77.74	37.25
Oxford	76.97	32.56
Cambridge	76.57	30.42

Hertsmere	70.23	29.77
Sutton	69.69	27.93
Reading	67.95	31.36
Crawley	67.70	30.22
Manchester	66.91	34.70
Richmond upon Thames	63.45	26.46
Peterborough	63.20	31.57
Birmingham	62.67	37.89
Coventry	61.60	30.28

The pattern revealed in table 5 is that the not white-British populations in London and surrounding local authority districts (such as Luton, Slough, Thurrock) are much less spatially concentrated within certain postcodes than in Midland and Northern local authorities (such as Birmingham, Blackburn with Darwen, Bradford). This is consistent with our findings that minorities in London are much more mixed residentially than in the North and Midlands.

Likewise, some communities are more likely to live in significantly ethnic postcodes than others, depending on the integration of their members, their sense of identity, the number of generations their members have lived in the UK and the importance of proximity to places of worship, temples, mosques and synagogues, and other community-related services.

Table 6 ranks the proportion of adults from different population groups[6] that are resident in significantly ethnic postcodes. This ranking shows that Somalis and Pakistanis are the two largest groups with the smallest proportion of their members living in white British neighbourhoods. Immigrants from the horn of Africa and from West Africa are seldom found outside locations with significant numbers of not white-British people.

Albanians are far more isolated than other Eastern European populations whilst it is northern Europeans such as Scandinavians, Germans and Dutch, as well as the Irish, who are most integrated with the white British. Koreans are the most well integrated among East Asians and Italians the least integrated among West Europeans. People with Jewish names are more likely to live in significantly ethnic postcodes than people of Polish heritage.

5. For technical reasons no % is given for Black West Indians

Table 6: Proportion of different populations living in significantly ethnic postcodes

Postcode Origins	% Resident in significantly ethnic postcodes
Northern Irish	16.78
Scottish	18.26
Welsh	19.01
English	21.52
Irish	24.01
Dutch Or Flemish	45.44
German	49.82
Scandinavian	51
French or Walloon	54.49
Italian or Maltese	61.77
Polish	62.43
Hungarian	65.52
Czech or Slovak	65.76
Jewish	66.29
Cantonese Chinese	66.65
Korean	67.74
Formerly Yugoslav	70.31
Baltic States	71.63
Spanish	71.73
Japanese	74.53
Other East Asian	74.76
Mandarin Chinese	75.25
Armenian	75.47
Not White-British	75.51
Greek Or Greek Cypriot	75.56
Filipino	76.58
Vietnamese	77.35
Black South African	77.78
Portugese or Brazilian	78.59
Bulgarian	81.77
Romanian	82.14
Turkish	82.3
Russian Or Ukrainian	82.92
Iranian	83.32
Other Black African	85.17
Sikh	85.63
Tamil Or Sri Lankan	86.21
Hindu Indian	86.34
North African Muslim	87.05
Bangladeshi Hindu	87.46
Albanian	87.76

Other Muslim	88.98
Ghanaian	90.55
Nigerian	91.07
Kashmiri	91.96
Bangladeshi	92.6
Pakistani	92.61
Somali	94.52
Ethiopian	96.72

Some would argue that the mark of a successful community is it becoming more integrated with the white British population as the proportion of its population living in significantly ethnic areas declines over time. Overall the proportion of the adult population of significantly ethnic areas that are not white-British has grown by 5.91%.

Table 7 shows that the ethnic majority English have, in relative terms, avoided or withdrawn most from significantly ethnic postcodes. On the other hand, the highest increases in share of residents in these more diverse areas as a proportion of the group's total have been among Romanians, Other Muslims and Pakistanis. Poles, Czechs, Japanese and Mandarin Chinese are the only population groups to be less numerous in significantly ethnic postcodes at the end of the decade than they were at the beginning - presumably because many members of these groups are successful and also their overall numbers are in decline.

Table 7: Change in proportion living in significantly ethnic postcodes, 2011 - 21

	2011 %	2021 %	Index 2021 to 2011	change
English	46.16	41.49	90	-4.67
Scottish	6.15	5.62	91	-0.53
Irish	5.42	5.08	94	-0.34
Welsh	4.07	3.75	92	-0.33
Polish	2.30	2.11	92	-0.20
Mandarin Chinese	0.48	0.34	69	-0.15
Northern Irish	0.30	0.26	87	-0.04
Czech or Slovak	0.50	0.49	97	-0.01
Japanese	0.13	0.12	92	-0.01
Greek or Greek Cypriot	0.70	0.70	100	0.00
Armenian	0.05	0.04	93	0.00
Jewish	0.45	0.45	99	0.00
Bangladeshi Hindu	0.02	0.03	139	0.01
Filipino	0.12	0.14	118	0.02
Ethiopian	0.06	0.08	135	0.02
Cantonese Chinese	0.61	0.63	103	0.02
Scandinavian	0.51	0.54	105	0.03

Tamil or Sri Lankan	1.03	1.06	103	0.03
Korean	0.24	0.27	112	0.03
Vietnamese	0.20	0.23	114	0.03
Bulgarian	0.08	0.13	156	0.05
Iranian	0.54	0.59	110	0.05
Other East Asian	0.24	0.30	125	0.06
Dutch or Flemish	0.89	0.95	108	0.07
Albanian	0.23	0.31	131	0.07
Formerly Yugoslav	0.35	0.43	121	0.07
Black Caribbean	0.39	0.46	119	0.07
Hungarian	0.29	0.39	134	0.10
Turkish	0.82	0.94	114	0.12
Somali	0.37	0.49	134	0.13
French or Walloon	1.04	1.19	114	0.14
Baltic States	0.42	0.56	132	0.14
Russian or Ukrainian	0.69	0.83	121	0.14
German	1.36	1.51	111	0.15
Black South African	0.80	0.95	119	0.15
Ghanaian	0.70	0.85	122	0.15
Nigerian	1.48	1.63	110	0.15
North African Muslim	0.66	0.82	123	0.15
Sikh	1.69	1.85	109	0.16
Other Black African	0.55	0.73	134	0.18
Portugese or Brazilian	1.01	1.22	121	0.21
Italian or Maltese	1.61	1.83	114	0.22
Hindu Indian	3.91	4.14	106	0.24
Spanish	1.20	1.49	124	0.28
Bangladeshi Muslim	1.35	1.65	122	0.30
Kashmiri	1.97	2.43	124	0.46
Pakistani	2.82	3.43	121	0.60
Romanian	0.31	1.02	330	0.71
Other Muslim	2.71	3.45	127	0.74

Affinities: who lives with whom?

Examining the ethnic make-up of minorities too small to create their own heartlands enables us to better understand how they culturally identify. Looking at the dominant minority in the postcodes where these Origins groups are found we can often see them "sheltering" in the shadow of communities with whom they have what we describe as an *affinity*.

It could be argued that knowledge of these affinities can help with the process of grouping minorities into larger categories. For example evidence that Ethiopians prefer living among Other Muslims (mostly Arab) than among Black Africans may influence whether we classify them within the wider group "Black African" or "Arab and Middle Eastern".

Cantonese Chinese and Mandarin Chinese tend not to live in the same postcodes nor do Nigerians and Ghanaians as much as might be supposed. Albanians, though Eastern European in geographic heritage, tend to live among other communities that share their predominantly Muslim faith and North African Muslims are more likely to live among other Muslim communities than among sub-Saharan Africans. Table 8 shows some of these affinities.[7]

Table 8: Affinities

Population group	Sheltered by
Czechs and Slovaks	Poles
Albanians	Other Muslims (mostly Arab)
Former Republic of Yugoslavia	Poles
Russians and Bulgarians	Poles
Armenians	Other Muslims (mostly Arab)
Ethiopians	Other Muslims (mostly Arab)
North African Muslims	Pakistanis
Somalis	Other Muslims (mostly Arab)
Japanese	Other Muslims (mostly Arab)

Who blends in?

How can we establish how assimilated a population group is into British culture? Clearly it is a difficult concept to measure via a questionnaire. What might act as a plausibly reliable proxy?

An approach we have found useful involves placing adults into population groups defined according to the heritage of their surnames only and then identifying the proportion each group who bear a white British first name. On the assumption that most parents choose names for their children according to the culture they self-identify with it is reasonable to assume that the group of adults with the highest proportion of white British personal names will be most assimilated and the group with the fewest the least.

Table 9 shows that the ethnic groups with the lowest proportions of adults with white British personal names are all South Asian groups: Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in particular but also Hindu Indians, Sikhs and Nepalese. Groups with the highest proportion with English first names are Jews, Scandinavians and people of North West European heritage. Naturally in some cases this is because white British first names may be used by, or drawn from, other cultures, such as the Jews. The ranking of ethnic groups by percentage with white British personal names correlates very well with the ranking by segregation.

6. Clearly affinity analysis is less reliable in the event that different communities share common names, particularly surnames or where these can not be correctly assigned to an Origins code.

Table 9: Ethnic heritage, % with white British personal name

Origins of family name	% with white British personal name
All adults	78.5
Northern Irish	91.4
Irish	90.3
Scottish	89.4
English	88.9
Welsh	88.2
Black Caribbean	81.8
Dutch	77.3
Israeli and Jewish	73.1
German	72.7
Norwegian	72.7
Swedish	72.2
Danish	71.8
Ugandan	70.3
French	70.2
Maltese	67.8
Swiss	62.7
Ghanian	60.1
Black Southern African	53.4
Croatian	52.8
Italian	51.0
Greek Cypriot	49.8
Filipino	48.5
Tanzanian	47.3
Spanish	46.1
Greek	45.4
Zimbabwean	44.8
Chinese Cantonese	44.7
Hungarian	44.1
Czech	43.7
Korean	43.3
Ukrainian	40.4
Portuguese	39.8
Brazilian	39.4
Serbian	39.0
Finnish	38.5
Congolese	37.0
Kenyan African	37.0
Pollish	34.0
Vietnamese	34.0
Japanese	33.8
Nigerian	33.7

Russian	32.5
Sierra Leonean	28.2
Chinese Mandarin	27.7
Ivorian	25.5
Monegasque	25.4
Ethiopian	22.5
Moroccan	21.1
Lebanese	20.8
Romanian	20.6
Algerian	19.5
Turkish	19.3
Albanian and Kosovan	18.3
Lithuanian	16.4
Bulgarian	13.8
West African Muslim	13.7
Iranian	13.6
Northern Macedonian	12.2
Sri Lankan	11.4
Somalian	10.7
Indian Hindi	9.6
Indian Sikh	9.6
Nepalese	9.2
Pakistani Kashmir	7.3
Bangladeshi Muslim	6.2
Pakistani	6.0

This pattern can be appreciated in terms of "cultural distance" whereby countries with a common Judeo-Christian heritage are more likely than others to share a common stock of personal (Judeo-Christian) names.

Further support to this hypothesis is given by the extent to which adults who bear a family name from a particular minority as well as a first name from the same group. This ethnic alignment varies according to the size of the given minority both in the immediate postcode but also in the local authority. In heartland areas, where the group is large, there is more alignment of first and last names, indicating less assimilation and mixing.

Minorities (as indicated by surname) are less likely to bear a white British personal name when they live in a postcode where their community is the largest one. Thus in postcodes where Sikhs represent both a significant minority and are the largest minority, as few as 5.5% bear white British personal names. This compares with 19.8% of Sikhs who do so in postcodes where 80% of more adults bear white British names. This relationship is statistically significant across local authorities.

Accordingly, we see from table 10 that the share of Sikhs with English first names falls to 4% or lower in local authorities such as Wolverhampton, Sandwell and Ealing where the Sikh community is both numerous and

relatively successful. It rises to over 10% in Medway and Newham, which have a smaller proportion of Sikhs. This likely reflects both intermarriage and cultural assimilation.

Table 10: Local authorities with the largest Sikh populations: heritage of personal name where family name is Sikh (based on a one million sample)

Local authority district	% adults with Sikh names	Total Sikh family names	Sikh family name, Sikh personal name	Sikh family name, white British personal name	% Sikh family name, white British personal name
Medway	1.64	72	49	9	12.5
Newham	1.83	112	71	12	10.7
Walsall	3.96	174	133	17	9.8
UK	0.64	6,399	4,184	607	9.5
Derby	2.73	107	80	10	9.3
Birmingham	2.65	458	309	42	9.2
Coventry	4.18	224	151	17	7.6
Slough	7.73	177	129	13	7.3
Bradford	0.99	86	64	6	7
Bedford	2.58	71	45	5	7
Leeds	1.13	144	109	9	6.3
Hillingdon	5.42	247	178	13	5.3
Hounslow	6.23	281	195	14	5
Redbridge	5.17	251	186	12	4.8
Ealing	6.05	346	241	14	4
Gravesham	5.29	84	73	3	3.6
Leicester	4.39	245	182	8	3.3
Wolverhampton	8.42	363	264	11	3
Sandwell	7.92	406	329	11	2.7

By contrast, variation in the use of white British personal names among Eastern Europeans is correlated with their date of arrival in the UK. Communities who migrated to Britain during the early post war period are far more likely to bear a white British personal name than recent arrivals from late EU accession countries. This reflects both assimilation and intermarriage. Indeed, census data shows that living in a mixed-ethnicity household is among the strongest predictors of whether a white British person is living in a diverse area, or a minority person is living in a heavily white area (Kaufmann and Harris 2014).[8]

Architectural Style and Ethnic Attraction

One possible policy measure for increasing neighbourhood mixing is to encourage certain architectural styles in newly-built housing.

A partial sense of the kinds of housing that attract different groups

7. https://paa2014.princeton.edu/abstracts/140166

is provided below. This is based on the 24 categories of local authority developed by the ONS based on census statistics from the 2011 census. While ethnicity is part of the classification, housing age and type also factors into the categories.

The four types of local authority with fastest rates of growth of not white-British adults between 2011 and 2021 are shown in table 11. They form four distinct environments and present four different challenges to their local authorities for achieving social integration. The first category contains relatively affordable outer London boroughs, the second traditional northern mill town local authorities, the third authorities along the Thames Estuary with affordable housing and good rail access to central London and the fourth a set of local authorities which have been subject to post war town expansion schemes and to rapid employment growth in service and distribution industries.

Table 11. Change in Percentage of not white-British adults by ONS Local Authority Classification, 2011-2021

	Category	ONS Code	Three local authorities most typical of category	% Increase in non white British adults 2011 - 2021
1	Ethnically diverse Metro-politan living	4a1r	Waltham Forest, Enfield, Croydon	5.19
2	Industrial and multi-ethnic	8a1r	Bolton, Rochdale, Oldham	4.86
3	City periphery	8b1r	Dartford, Gravesham, Basildon	4.42
4	Expanding areas	8b2r	Northampton, Swindon, Peterborough	5.38

The most typical examples of *ethnically diverse Metropolitan living*, the first category, are Waltham Forest, Enfield and Croydon. This is where many communities of recent migrants – including Albanians, people from former Yugoslavia, Romanians, Black South African, Somalis, Kashmiris and Bangladeshis – are growing the most rapidly. Over the last ten years it is Other Muslims, Sikhs and North Africans that have been most attracted to *Industrial and multi-ethnic* authorities such as Bolton, Rochdale and Oldham or where natural increase has been fastest. *City periphery* locations such as Dartford, Gravesham and Basildon have attracted Poles, Nigerians and Indians whilst Portuguese, Hungarians, people from the Baltic States, Russians and Ghanaians are minorities which have grown fastest (as a % of the adult population) in *Expanding areas* such as Northampton, Swindon and Peterborough.

By contrast, as table 12 highlights, types of local authority that have experienced very little increase in their not white-British population fall into three distinct groups: farming, rural and Northern Irish communities; coastal and retirement areas; and a category referred to as London Cosmopolitan, a group of eleven inner London local authorities the most

typical of which are Hammersmith and Fulham, Southwark and Lambeth which have been an important residential location for many minority groups in recent decades.

Table 12: Change in % of not white-British Adults, by ONS Local Authority Classification

Subgroup Name	2011 (%)	2021 (%)	Change (in % of total adults)	Change (in % of 2011 non white British)
Manufacturing Legacy	6.52	8.31	1.79	27.47
City Periphery	16.28	20.71	4.42	27.16
Expanding Areas	20.1	25.48	5.38	26.77
Urban Living	12.05	15.24	3.2	26.53
Industrial and Multi-ethnic	18.83	23.69	4.86	25.79
Mining Legacy	4.53	5.58	1.05	23.11
Scottish Industrial Legacy	5.11	6.2	1.09	21.26
Service Economy	6.83	8.27	1.43	20.94
Prosperous Towns	8.43	10.15	1.72	20.35
Rural Growth Areas	10.79	12.88	2.08	19.3
Prosperous Semi-rural	6.45	7.64	1.19	18.47
Country Living	7.18	8.5	1.32	18.37
Scottish Countryside	5.08	5.98	0.9	17.72
Affluent rural	10.16	11.82	1.66	16.29
Rural-Urban Fringe	18.62	21.6	2.98	15.98
Sparse English and Welsh Countryside	5.9	6.72	0.83	14
Larger Towns and Cities	14.92	16.88	1.95	13.09
Ageing Coastal Living	6.65	7.44	0.79	11.83
Ethnically Diverse Metropolitan Living	45.85	51.04	5.19	11.32
Seaside Living	8.95	9.89	0.95	10.58
Older Farming Communities	6.56	7.22	0.66	10.09
University Towns and Cities	27.61	30.18	2.58	9.33
Northern Ireland Countryside	5.62	5.77	0.15	2.64
London Cosmopolitan	46.83	47.34	0.51	1.1

To investigate the specific role of housing style further, figure 12 provides data on newbuilds based on new postcodes in Gravesham. It is assumed that new housing of this kind tends to be contemporary rather than reflecting period styles. The average share of white Britons in newbuild areas is 1.82 percent, below the average of 2.04 percent of people living in new postcodes. This could reflect many dynamics, but may also reveal that newbuild housing is more attractive to not white-British people. Thus

4.5 percent of Poles, 4.6 percent of Nigerians and 6.1 percent of those from the Baltic states lived in newbuild housing compared to 1.8 percent of white Britons.

It would be useful to obtain information on whether new housing of different architectural style contains a higher or lower share of different groups when controlling for price. For instance, period newbuilds might be used to attract white British families to superdiverse areas which they appear to be avoiding more than other groups. This in addition to measures to ensure a socioeconomic mix of housing, which may also correlate with ethnic differences and thereby improve integration.

Figure 12



Conclusion

This report has presented a number of different indicators which can be used as proxies for the extent to which different minorities have assimilated into UK society or retained a distinctive sense of identity based on their heritage. These include measures of segregation, the extent to which a group lives in significantly ethnic areas and the degree to which its members live in postcodes where they form the largest minority group. To this we can now add the extent to which they choose British personal names for their children. (Clearly this is only one measure of successful integration, as the names Rishi Sunak, Priti Patel and Kwasi Kwarteng attest!)

The funding and targeting of strategies for integrating minority populations will be far more effective if policymakers recognise the fine-grained distinctions between minority populations outlined in this report: the distinction between places characterised by melting pots and parallel lives, the extent to which minorities live in significantly ethnic postcodes and, to a more limited extent, the degree to which white British personal names are in use.

Chapter Three: Where we go from here

By David Goodhart

This report hasn't attempted to set out a detailed policy agenda for change, but rather to consider the factors that have prevented mainstream politicians from investing in issues of connectedness and integration alongside an analysis of what is happening on the ground with ethnic minority integration and segregation. The pandemic, as Brendan Cox noted in chapter one, has created a greater willingness to talk about where we all connect and where we don't.

This final chapter will sketch out a few ideas that might be pursued by policy makers but first it will take a brief look at the other area of public life where people worry about segregation along ethnic lines—namely schooling (the data in the next section is drawn from the highly recommended 2020 publication *Ethnic Segregation Between Schools* by Richard Harris and Ron Johnston).

Schools, is there a problem or not?

Most ethnic minority pupils attend schools, at primary and secondary level, where minority pupils are in the majority. *Moreover, over 40% of ethnic minority pupils attend a school that is less than 25% White British*. But it is also true that for most ethnic minority pupils the largest single group they will encounter is the White British (the two exceptions to this rule are Bangladeshis and Pakistanis).

So is this a story, like the neighbourhood one, of a gradual dispersal of ethnic minority populations into less minority dominated schools or is clustering continuing or even getting worse?

The picture (the data here refers only to England 2010 to 2017) is, as ever, complex and mixed but the overall trend seems to be towards more mixing albeit from a low base in the case of some groups, especially Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. Secondary schools are generally more diverse than primary.

School intakes generally reflect the demography of their neighbourhoods, even in the era of school choice. But that is not true for everyone. In 2017 the average Bangladeshi and Pakistani pupil was in a school less diverse than the neighbourhood, that was also true of Indian and Black African pupils but only at primary level.

The groups that have been growing fastest among school pupils in recent years are Pakistanis, Indians, Black Africans, Asian Other, Mixed and White Other. One result of that increase is that the potential 'exposure' of members of the eight main minority groups to White British pupils has declined, at a local authority level, while exposure of the White British to other ethnic groups has increased.

The Index of Dissimilarity, the way that academics measure degrees of segregation in schools and neighbourhoods, has been more or less static for schools in recent years. What has not been static in the 2010 to 2017 period is the proportion of White British pupils in secondary schools which declined from 77.3% to 69.5%. The decline in primary schools was less sharp from 73.8% to 67.2%.

The number of schools in which the White British make up more than 90% of pupils has also been in sharp decline between 2011 and 2017: from 50.4% to 37.6% for primary schools and from 49.3% to 35.1% for secondary. The places where these schools are concentrated are Cumbria, North Norfolk, West Somerset and Northumberland.

Places where the White British account for fewer than 10% of pupils in more than half of schools are mainly in London—Newham, Brent, Tower Hamlets, Harrow, Haringey, Lambeth, Redbridge and Ealing—but are also quite common in Slough, Birmingham, Leicester, Luton, Bradford, Blackburn, Manchester and Oldham. White British pupils are most separated from Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black Caribbean pupils.

But schools that are 90%-plus of a group other than the White British are rare. In 2017 there were just nine such schools in which Bangladeshis predominated to that extent, six in which Indians did and 16 in which Pakistanis did.

What is not so rare is for the proportion of South Asian pupils *together* to significantly outstrip the neighbourhood demographic pattern by 25 percentage points or more. Over half of secondary schools in both Blackburn and Oldham fall into this category as do one third of secondary schools in Tower Hamlets, Bradford and Burnley.

Concluding thoughts and policy ideas

So how can policy lean against the tendency to cluster and speed up the gradual process of dispersal and mixing in both neighbourhoods and schools?

To repeat: there are no simple answers to the conundrums of integration and segregation in liberal societies, and that goes for class and generational divides as well as ethnic ones.

Reasonable people disagree not only about the main obstacles to integration but also about what a well-integrated society looks like. While recognising that strong 'people like us' feelings persist in many communities (majority and minority), which places some limits on the desire to mix, most of us also believe that a decent society is one with lots of contacts between citizens and a sense of trust and mutual recognition across lines of difference.

Modern liberalism demands, rightly, that everyone be treated the same in the public sphere or at least be given the same opportunities; but that does not mean that everyone is the same. And that raises sensitive issues about how we live together: about contact, trust and familiarity, about areas people feel comfortable living in and areas they don't, schools they are happy to send their children to and those they are not.

There is plenty of polling evidence to suggest that people want to live in more mixed communities than they actually do. There will of course be many different definitions of mixed but it seems difficult to maintain communities that have the sort of 70:30 majority/minority balance that most people in both groups say they are happy with.

As the political theorist Thomas Schelling noted back in the 1970s there is a disconnect between individual preferences and social outcomes: in a very high-mobility society, just a small degree of preference for living among one's own 'type' can generate a completely segregated outcome; an outcome more segregated than any one person would individually want.

This is part of the justification for Government intervention to help to nudge us in the direction that we say we want to go—in relation to where we live, who our children go to school with and so on. This requires respecting peoples' intuitions about familiarity and continuity while also encouraging more mixing and greater comfort with ethnic difference.

Here is a list of policies that have been proposed to promote more mixing across ethnic lines in the past 20 years.

- Breaking out of the segregation equilibrium in schools by launching new self-consciously mixed schools (such as the Waterhead Academy in Oldham).
- Incentivizing education authorities to reproduce the overall demographic mix of a local authority area in individual schools and lean against the minority that are significantly more segregated than their neighbourhoods.
- Introduce a statutory duty on local authorities and other public bodies to actively promote integration (not just social cohesion),
- Require local authorities to publish statistics every five years on the demographic mix in schools and neighbourhoods, thereby creating an incentive to avoid being labeled one of the most segregated local authorities in Britain.
- Ban 'single ethnicity' funding of cultural activities (as was once pioneered by Robin Wales when Mayor of Newham).
- Require the Electoral Commission to consider the ethnic mix of constituencies to see whether they have an electorate that reflects the wider area of which the constituency is a part.
- Three months of compulsory national citizen service with a mission to mix the races and classes.
- Consider how the location of new places of worship can help to spread groups into new neighbourhoods

- Consider the relationship between architectural style and ethnicity. Newbuilds may appeal more to some minority groups, period homes to white Britons (see chapter two).
- Providing information to home buyers and renters about a wider range of possible neighbourhoods that meet their desired ethnic mix rather than having them rely on the media or social networks for information, which often overestimate the size of outgroups. An example from America is the Oak Park Regional Housing Center.[9]

With the exception of point one, which has not been notably successful, none of these policy initiatives has been seriously tried.

As Brendan Cox noted in chapter one there are many reasons for this lack of focus including the absence of a consistent lobby for integration and the shyness of both main political parties about tackling the issue.

This creates an unusually wide gap between political practice and the rhetoric of those who are concerned about the issue. Consider this from Jon Yates, the writer and founder of The Challenge (an organisation dedicated to improving integration), evoking Victorian institution building.

"The debate on the need for more integration is broadly over. The key debate today is not if but how. How do we build a more integrated society—by age, income and ethnicity. This is the same debate our ancestors, the Victorians, faced. As their country was transformed by a surging birth-rate, growing inequality and fast urbanisation they faced a society in danger of social fracture. Their response was to build a series of institutions where people of all ages, backgrounds and incomes came together, were treated with a degree of equality and took part in a common purpose. It is time for us to do the same."[10]

Yates has written a good book on the subject of integration, *Fractured*, but the goal of mass institution building does not seem realistic. (And one of the big differences between the Victorian age and now is that Victorian Britain was not a democracy. Christian-inspired business and political elites had a relatively free hand to shape institutions as they saw fit.)

The cause of integration is much better served by the more recent developments in "nudge" thinking, encouraging people to overcome the barriers to social changes they say they want but tend not to actually choose in everyday life. The example of the Oak Park Regional Housing Center in America, mentioned above, where accurate information or marketing is used to counteract informational shortcuts and preconceptions is one example.

But the politics of integration is not just about nudging by public authorities. It is also about supporting micro-initiatives promoted by a growing body of organisations such as The Together Coalition, a coalition that stretches from the Sun to the Mirror, the Scouts to Facebook, the FA to the CBI. There are other organisations that specialise in community connectedness like the Big Lunch, British Future, Jo Cox Foundation, Near Neighbours, Cares, NCS, Belong, the Linking Network, and countless local

8. Krysan, M. and K. Crowder (2018). "Promoting Integrative Residential Choices: What Would It Take." Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University.
9. Mapping Integration, Demos (2014), p43

initiatives, that should be supported to grow. The All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Integration and the House of Lords Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement both do good work in researching and highlighting the subject.

The way that the national conversation on the subject is framed remains important too. The late Rabbi Sacks argued that Britain has been living with the unconscious habits of a traditional society, unable to tell our story to each other and making the mistake of assuming that we all know it. Integration does not happen automatically and a new national narrative that almost everyone can feel comfortable with, in the manner of the 2012 Olympic opening ceremony, both grows organically *and* needs conscious crafting.

We should also be concerned about the ideological divergence between locally-rooted 'Somewhere' and mobile progressive 'Anywhere' Britons in how we think about diversity, freedom of expression and history. So far our politics has largely avoided the red state/blue state polarisation of the US and the ethnicization of politics. But as the ethnic minority grows towards one third of the population (already close to the ethnic minority proportion in English schools) majority anxiety is likely to increase among Somewheres in some parts of the country, especially where there is little contact and trust across ethnic boundaries. The extreme right fringe remains weak but it could feed off that lack of contact and trust. This in turn could prompt sweeping accusations of racism from progressive metropolitan quarters which could generate a cycle of populist backlash and progressive alarmism, setting in motion a process that may end in US-style polarisation.

Framing the integration issue as an "everyone" issue, as recommended by Brendan Cox, should not mean ignoring real issues of ethnic division. But by joining the dots between ethnically segregated schools and, say, the hidden army of lonely old people, and seeing them both as part of a bigger issue of social connection in rich, liberal societies, we might make it easier to have a meaningful conversation.

And, finally, the combination of the post-Brexit levelling up domestic priority and the impact of the Covid pandemic itself has given the issue of social connection a new visibility.

The levelling up focus on rebuilding struggling towns has the benefit of support from both sides of politics and "pride in place" has become an explicit category in the policy debate and not just an afterthought. Levelling up will only succeed if it addresses issues of belonging, connection and identity.

And there is a potential overlap here with issues of ethnic segregation. Paul Ormerod, chair of the Rochdale Development Agency, says that levelling up can contribute to transcending the ethnic divide in places like Rochdale and Oldham. He also points to the fact that graduate retention is one of the big issues for left behind areas and that places with large South Asian Muslim populations often do better in this regard because young Muslims either tend to study locally or return after graduating.

Finally, increased community connection has been one of the few upsides to the Covid pandemic. We have felt closer to each other and the crisis has tapped into a desire to build on that, as well as galvanising a wave of volunteering across the usual divides of class and ethnicity.

The issues of integration and connection that we have focused on in this report are not going to suddenly move to the top of the list of national concerns, especially in the context of the new global conflict with Russia. But there appears to be, at least, a greater willingness by those in positions of influence to acknowledge that better connections are fundamental to our community and individual wellbeing.

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